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1956] OFFICERS' TORT LIABILITY 201 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS' TORT LIABILITY* 
Kenneth Culp Davist 
CASE law on tort liability of public officers and employees is much more interesting than one might expect on the basis of 
abstract contemplation. The traditional common-law notion that 
an employee should, as against the employer, bear the ultimate 
responsibility for his negligence has been exposed as seriously 
unrealistic in a holding by a unanimous Supreme Court; the 
decision concerning the government employee is potentially ap-
plicable to corporate employees. The many holdings that officers 
are not liable for deliberate and malicious torts are based on the 
intriguing view that justice cannot be done when malice is proved, 
without opening the door to unjustified charges that conscientious 
officers have acted maliciously. Settled law that police officers 
are personally liable for false arrest and related torts is in process 
of becoming unsettled, under the leadership of the California 
Supreme Court, and the reasons in favor of a basic change see_m 
impressive. The law of torts involving excess of jurisdiction is 
still trying to rid itself of an unsound push given it by Justice 
Holmes in 1891, and to some extent it is succeeding. Especially 
fascinating is the rise and partial decline, during the decade from 
1944 to 1954, of a literal interpretation of an 1871 federal statute, 
the Civil Rights Act. The present study reaches the somewhat 
surprising conclusion that some of the principal points made 
by Professor Jennings, in an excellent 1937 article1 which has 
been widely influential, are out of line with the case law, and that 
these pai:ticular aspects of the case law are probably sound. 
l. THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF OFFICERS' IMMUNITY 
The central principle that takes care of the great bulk of prac-
tical problems concerning tort liability of public officers and 
public employees is that officers are generally immune from lia-
bility for their unintentional fault in the exercise of discretionary 
functions. · Federal law in support of this principle is firm and 
• This article is a companion to another on a closely related subject, "Tort Liability 
_of Governmental Units," 40 MINN. L. REv. 751 (1956). Professor Allan H. McCoid of the 
University of Minnesota Law School has made helpful suggestions about this article, 
which are gratefully acknowledged. 
t Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; A.B. 1931, Whitman College, LL.B. 1934, 
Harvard; author of text on Administrative Law (1951).-Ed. 
1 See note 152 infra. 
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clear, and most of the state law is equally so, although many state 
cases still seem to cling to the view that was once dominant that 
officers should be liable for their fault even when they are exercis-
ing discretion. By and large, the present law is the antithesis of 
Dicey' s proposition that "every official, from the Prime Minister 
down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same 
responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any 
other citizen. "2 Indeed, one may doubt whether English courts 
at any time would have held the Prime Minister liable personally 
on account of exercise of discretionary power. 
The background for the law conferring immunity upon ad-
ministrative officers exercising discretionary powers is the law 
concerning immunity of judges. The Supreme Court early held: 
"It is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper 
administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the 
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convic• 
tions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself . 
. . . The principle ... obtains in all countries where there is any 
well-ordered system of jurisprudence.''3 The doctrine has been 
rigorously applied in recent times with the explanation that "The 
purpose of the rule which exempts public officers from the harass-
ment of private suits for damages on account of the performance 
of their public duties, is, secondarily, for their protection, in order 
that its primary objective may be secured, i.e., a fearless administra-
tion of the law.''4 The rule applies equally to inferior judges 
and even to justices of the peace.5 Occasional liability has been 
2 DICEY, THE LAw OF THE CoNsrITUTION, 8th ed., 189 (1915). The "rule of law," 
according to Dicey, "excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others from the duty 
of obedience to the law which governs other citizens." Id. at 198. But see the preface to 
the 9th edition, xvi (1939), by Emlyn C. 5. Wade: Dicey's critics "reject, and I believe 
rightly, his conception of the rule of law •.. .'' And at p. xcii: Dicey "seems ... not 
sufficiently to have regarded the immunities which the prerogative rule - the Crown can 
do no wrong- afforded, and still largely affords, to Crown servants in this country.'' 
3 Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 335 at 347 (1872). For especially penetrating 
analyses, see Jennings, "Tort Liability of Administrative Officers," 21 MINN. L. R.Ev. 263 
(1937); James, "Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers," 22 UNIV. CHI. 
L. Rev. 610 (1955). See also Powell, "Administrative Exercise of the Police Power," 24 
HARv. L. R.Ev. 441 (19ll); David, "The Tort Liability of Municipal Officers,'' 12 So. CAL. 
L. R.Ev. 368 (1939); Keefe, "Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials,'' 12 FoRD. 
L. REV. 130 (1943). 
4 Booth v. Fletcher, (D.C. Cir. 1938) IOI F. (2d) 676 at 680, cert. den. 307 U.S. 628 
(1939). See also Fletcher v. Wheat, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 432, cert. den. 307 U.S. 
621 (1939). The principle of judicial immunity is so strong that the Supreme Court has 
held that a Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was immune from 
liability for acting in bad faith even despite the clear implication of a statute providing 
immunity for acting in good faith. Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913). 
5 Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P. (2d) 242 (1943); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Blumen-
thal, 129 Conn. 545, 29 A. (2d) 751 {1943). 
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imposed on account of ministerial acts6 or pursuant to special 
statutory provision.7 
As early as 1845 the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of 
judicial immunity to the Postmaster General who was sued for 
refusing to make payments to the plaintiffs: "A public officer is 
not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case where the act 
to be done is not merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation 
to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even 
although an individual may suffer by his mistake. A contrary 
principle would indeed be pregnant with the greatest mischiefs."8 
A half century later the Court held the Postmaster General im-
mune from liability for defamation, uttering one sentence which 
forms the foundation for much later law: "[T]he same general 
considerations of public policy and convenience which demand 
for judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from civil 
suits for damages arising from acts done by them in the course 
of the performance of their judicial functions, apply to a large 
extent to official communications made by heads of Executive De-
partments when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon 
them by law."9 The Secretary of the Interior accordingly has an 
absolute privilege to include malicious defamation in a press 
release concerning official business,10 and the Secretary of the 
Treasury is not liable for "arbitrary, wanton, capricious, illegal, 
malicious, oppressive, and contemptuous" action.11 
Federal courts have held that the immunity similarly applies 
to the Attorney General, members of a parole board, a parole 
executive, a warden, and a director of prisons;12 to the Comptroller 
6 De Courcey v. Cox, 94 Cal. 665, 30 P. 95 (1892); Stensrud v. Delamater, 56 Mich. 
144, 22 N.W. 272 (1885). 
A significant and unusual case is Murray v. Brancato, 290 N.Y. 52, 48 N.E. (2d) 257 
(1943), holding four to three that a judge is liable for defamation by acting with malice 
in delivering opinions to unofficial publishers for publication in the New York Supplement 
and the New York Law Journal. But the court declared (at p. 56) that "even if those 
opinions had been written with knowledge of their falsity and with actual intent to injure 
the plaintiff, the defendant, in accord with the well-established public policy, would be 
exempt from liability for 'composing' the opinions." 
7 The statute is the Civil Rights Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §§1981 to 
1984, discussed in Part VI below. 
s Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 87 at 98 (1845). 
9 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 at 498 (1896). 
10 Glass v. Ickes, (D.C. Cir. 1940) II7 F. (2d) 273, cerL den. 311 U.S. 718 (1941). See 
note, 33 Iu.. L. R.Ev. 358 (1938). 
11 Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, (D.C. Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 557, cerL den. 
293 U.S. 605 (1934). 
12 Lang v. Wood, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 2ll, cert. den. 302 U.S. 686 (1937). In 
Gregoire v. Biddle (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579, cert. den. 339 U.S. 949 (1950), two 
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' of the Currency and his deputies, a United States attorney and 
his assistant,. the general counsel for the division of insolvent banks 
of the Treasury Department, and a special agent for the FBI;13 
to the members of the SEC;14 to members of a draft board;15 to 
the President's confidential assistant, a special assistant to the 
Attorney General, a director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons· and 
a warden of a· federal penitentiary;16 to a prosecuting attorney;17 
to a bankruptcy conciliation commissioner;18 and to a director of 
an alien enemy control unit and a district director of immigra-
tion;19 to immigration officials, including an immigration inspec-
tor;20 to a psychiatrist in a federal prison;21 and to members of a 
Milwaukee town board, including a building inspector, a health 
officer, an attorney, and a plumbing inspector.22 
Possibly the most doubtful decision is the application of the 
immunity to one denominated "a Special Agent of the- [Federal] 
Bureau of Investigation."23 The court recognized "a general rule 
that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully, although in good 
faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil action and cannot claim the 
immunity of the sovereign,"24 and it acknowledged that "Even 
police, detectives and investigators . . . are generally not trained 
for participation in judicial determinations; and are sometimes 
apt to. be come oppressive in administration of their duties, unless 
kept under close restraint by prosecutors and judges .... "25 But 
the court nevertheless held the FBI agent immune: "When the 
act done occurs in the course of official duty of the person duly 
appointed and required to act, it is the official action of the depart-
ment; and the same reason for immunity applies as if it had been 
attorneys general, two directors of the Enemy Control Unit, and the district director of 
immigration at Ellis Island were held not liable for damages for allegedly malicious action 
in arresting and holding the plaintiff as an enemy alien. 
13 Cooper v. O'Connor, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 135. 
14 Jones v. Kennedy, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 40, cert. den. 314 U.S. 665 (1941). 
The case also held that counsel in the employ of the government could properly defend 
the officers. On this question, see annotation, 130 A.L.R. 736 (1941). 
15 Gibson v. Reynolds, (8th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 95, cert. den. 337 U.S. 925 (1949). 
16 Laughlin v. Rosenman, (D.C. Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 838. 
17 Yaselli v. Goff, (2d Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 396, affd. 275 U.S. 503 (1927). 
18 Adair v. Bank of America Nat. Trust Se Savings Assn., 303 U. S. 350 (1938). 
19 Gregoire v. Biddle, (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579, cert. den. 339 U.S. 949 (1950). 
20 Papagianakis v. The Samos, (4th Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 257, cert. den. 341 U.S. 
921 (1951). 
21 Taylor v. Glotfelty, (6th Cir. 1952) 201 F. (2d) 51. 
22 Baker v. Mueller, (7th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 180. 
23 Cooper v. O'Connor, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 135. 
24Id. ·at 137. 
- 25 Id. at 141. 
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performed by the superior officer himself.''26 Another federal 
court has later observed that "In only one case does it appear that 
an agent of the FBI was accorded such immunity," and denied a 
motion to dismiss a complaint against the agent.27 
Recent state cases seem usually to hold that officers who exer-
cise discretionary functions are immune from liability for their 
negligence or for other unintentional tort. Thus, an attorney 
general who wrote a letter to plaintiff's superior, demanding that 
plaintiff be dismissed as an assistant district attorney because of 
alleged communist associations, was held immune, even though 
the letter was released to the newspapers.28 Village officers are 
immune from liability for revoking a liquor license.20 A state fish 
and game warden is held not liable for failing to furnish blanks 
to one previously selected to sell licenses.30 Members of a hospital 
board are not liable for ·wrongful discharge of employees.31 An 
investigator of the California Fish and Game Commission is im-
mune from liability for malicious prosecution.32 Other officers 
are similarly held immune.33 
Recent state decisions imposing liability are exceptional and 
usually rest on special reasons. One of the most startling is a 
decision of the New York Court of Appeals34 that a complaint 
seeking damages from election officials for refusing to place the 
plaintiff's name on the ballot was sufficient to state a cause of 
action. The court acknowledged the existence of "a line of cases 
holding that public officers with entirely different duties are not 
liable for damages, at the suit of a citizen, for making nonmalicious 
26 Id. at 142. 
27 Kozlowski v. Ferrara, (S.D. N.Y. 1954) 117 F. Supp. 650 at 652. 
28 Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A. (2d) 892 (1952). A dissenting judge argued 
mainly that the attorney general was acting outside the scope of bis authority. 
20 Paoli v. Mason, 325 Ill. App. 197, 59 N.E. (2d) 499 (1945). The principle, quoted 
(at p. 209) from another case, was said to be that "officers exercising . • • judicial powers 
.•. 'are exempt from liability for error or mistake of judgment in the exercise of their 
duty in the absence of corrupt or malicious motives.' " 
30 Meinecke v. McFarland, 122 Mont. 515, 206 P. (2d) 1012 (1949). The case bas 
special strength as an authority for immunity because the fact came out that the officer 
was bonded: "The liability of the surety cannot exceed that of bis principal.'' Id. at 522. 
81 Wilson v. Hirst, 67 Ariz. 197, 193 P. (2d) 461 (1948). The court made a good 
statement of the reason for the immunity (at p. 202): "The doctrine of immunity ••. 
is for the benefit of all to whom it applies, that they may be free to act in the exercise 
of honest judgment, uninfluenced by fear of consequences personal to themselves." 
32 White v. Towers, 37 Cal. (2d) 727, 235 P. (2d) 209 (1951). Three of the seven 
judges dissented. 
83 Trum v. Town of Paxton, 329 Mass. 434, 109 N.E. (2d) 116 (1952) (road com-
missioner not liable for failing to cut brush along public way); Leger v. Kelley, 19 Conn. 
Supp. 167, 110 A. (2d) 635 (1954) (state commissioner of motor vehicles not liable for 
negligently registering car having no safety glass). · 
S4 Schwartz v. Heffernan, 304 N.Y. 474, 109 N.E. (2d) 68 (1952). 
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and nonfraudulent mistakes adversely affecting that citizen's rights 
or interests."35 It disposed of that line of cases by holding: "But 
a different public policy operates as to election officials. . . . . For at 
least two centuries the courts in jurisdictions with representative 
forms of government have given most special protection to a citi-
zen's right to vote ... and, correlatively, his right to be a candidate . 
• • • " 36 The case can also be explained as not involving a discretion-
ary function, for the court said that, "the board's power to de-
termine the validity of a nominating petition 'extends only to 
ministerial examination' .... "37 Still another possible way to ex-
plain the case is by emphasizing that the court said: "Surely, this 
amended complaint accuses defendants of more than a mere good-
faith mistake."38 
When a surety or insurance company is the real defendant, 
courts may find the imposition of liability easier. Such a case may 
be no more significant than a case in which a truck driver is held 
liable for his negligence, where his company carries liability in-
surance covering the accident. For instance, that a dog catcher was 
held liable for failing to catch a rabid dog may be easily explained 
by the fact that an insurance company was a co-defendant.39 
IL LIABILITY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR MINISTERIAL AcTS 
Somewhere a line supposedly separates the performance of 
judicial, legislative, executive, and other "discretionary" functions 
from manual, clerical and other "ministerial" work. The officer 
who exercises what the courts call discretionary power is immune 
from tort liability, but the public employee whose tasks are re-
garded as ministerial is liable. 
Even if an attorney general acts maliciously, he is immune, 
But even if the truck driver is guilty of nothing more serious than 
the kind of momentary human misjudgment that is common to 
all drivers, he is personally liable. 
The reasons for immunity of officers exercising discretionary 
35 Id. at 482. 
86 Ibid. 
37 Id. at 480. 
38 Id. at 482. In Larson v. Marsh, 144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W. (2d) 189 (1944), officers 
were held liable for failing to place a name on a ballot. The duty was regarded as min-
isterial, and bonding companies were co-defendants. 
39 Serpas v. Margiotta, (La. App. 1952) 59 S. (2d) 492. A surety is liable for dis-
charge of a deputy sheriff's shotgun at plaintiff's car, even though the surety is the State 
of Nevada. Hill v. Thomas, 70 Nev. 389, 270 P. (2d) 179 (1954). A constable and his 
sureties have been held liable for false imprisonment, even where the constable's action 
seemed quite reasonable. Ingles v. Hotze, 191 Okla. 378, 130 P. (2d) 302 (1942). 
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power are impressive and probably sound, as we have seen. The 
provocative question, on which the law may be in process of basic 
change, is whether the immunity should attach to the employee 
who commits an unintentional tort in the performance of minis-
terial functions. This question is becoming more important than 
it used to be, for the increased incomes of this class of workers 
mean that they are less often judgment-proof. We have reason to 
inquire whether the common-law tradition is quite at variance 
with the realities. 
Judicial opinions may say,40 the Restatement may provide,41 
and most lawyers may assume that employees are legally liable for 
their unintentional wrongs. But the plain facts of business are 
otherwise. When the typical corporation is held vicariously liable 
for an employee's negligence, the corporation does not seek in-
demnity from the employee, whatever may be its theoretical legal 
right to indemnity. If the typical corporation were to do so, the 
problem would no doubt be quickly taken care of through a col-
lective agreement; the union would force the corporation to pro-
tect the employees through insurance ( or through self-insur-
ance ). The overwhelming judgment of businessmen is that the 
enterprise, not the individual employee, should bear the losses that 
result from unintentional harms in carrying on business activi-
ties. Corporate managements assume this, and they have typically 
acted voluntarily in obtaining the requisite insurance, protecting 
not only the corporation but also its employees. The traditional 
notion of the common law that any individual musfbe ultimately 
liable for his own wrong has been undercut by the more funda-
mental principle-apparently felt by businessmen more than by 
judges and lawyers-that the enterprise, not the employee, should 
assume the responsibility for the natural and normal consequences 
of business activity. 
40 E.g., Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943): "The liability of an agent 
for his own negligence has long been embedded in the law. • • • The principle is an 
ancient one and applies even to certain acts of public officers or public instrumentalities." 
Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420 at 423, 97 P. 875 (1908): "The employee's responsi-
bility is primary. He is responsible because he committed the wrongful or negligent act. 
The employer's responsibility is secondary .••• The principal ••. may indemnify him-
self to the full amount against his agent. These legal propositions ••• receive universal 
recognition." 
In England, after the employer's insurance company has been held liable on account 
of the employee's negligence, the insurance company may recover from the employee. 
Romford Ice &: Cold Storage Co. v. Lister, [1955) 3 W.L.R. 631. 
41 AGENCY REsrATEMENT §401, comment c (1933): "Unless he has been authorized to 
act in the manner in which he acts, the agent who subjects his principal to liability 
because of a negligent or other wrongful act is himself subject to liability to the principal 
for the loss which results therefrom." 
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If a governmental unit is the employer, the realities are the 
same, except to the extent that the government is an even better 
loss spreader than the corporate enterprise. Under the Tort ·claims 
Act the government is now liable for most unintentional torts re-
sulting from ministerial work. When the government is liable, 
a plaintiff is unlikely to seek recovery from the employee. The 
most important practical question is therefore whether or not ~e 
government should be entitled to indemnity from the employee 
after the government has been held liable for the employee's neg-
ligence. Another way to put the question is to ask whether the 
loss should be borne by the government, which is best able to 
bear it, or by the employee, who is least able to bear it. 
A set of hypothetical facts will con,tribute to an appi:.eciation 
of the realities. A driver of a mail truck drives ten years before 
his first accident. The government is held liable for $5,000. The 
driver earns $4,000 a year, has three children in school, but still 
has managed to accumulate savings of $5,000. Should the $5,000 
be absorbed as a part of the cost of carrying the mail, or should 
it come out of the driver's savings? The common-law theory, as 
stated by Professor Seavey, is that "indemnity should be granted 
under the ordinary rules of restitution because the employee 
caused a loss which in equity and good conscience should be paid 
by him."42 The theory is deeply entrenched, and doubtless most 
lawyers still believe in the legal principles which have long been 
familiar to them. Professor Seavey generalizes that "warm hearts, 
even in the breasts of able and conscientious judges, may make 
bad law."43 In this, Professor Seavey is surely right. Warm hearts 
may make bad law. But warm hearts may also discover bad law 
and correct it. The time may be ripe for judges and lawyers to 
catch up with the attitudes of businessmen and of governmental 
administrators and to give serious consideration to the question 
of whether an enterprise should absorb many or most or all of the 
losses that are normal and expected in carrying on its activities. 
The governmental practice, as well as the corporate practice, 
has been ahead of the legal development. A sample of the govern-
mental reality, as distinguished from the common-law tradition, 
is found in Private Law 820, Eighty-second Congress, providing 
42 Seavey," 'Liberal Construction' and the Tort Liability of the Federal Government," 
f/1 HARV. L. REv. 994 at 1002 (1954) . 
.(3 Id. at 1003. 
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for reimbursement of a mail truck driver who had been held liable 
to a claimant for negligence in the operation of his truck.44 
Another sample of the governmental reality can be found in 
a formal opinion of the Attorney General of the United States 
in 1941.411 The Secretary of Agriculture asked whether an em-
ployee, who had become intoxicated and while driving a govern-
ment car had had an accident, could be required to reimburse the 
government for a payment made to the injured party. The intoxi-
cation makes the case a much stronger one for requiring reim-
bursement than a case of ordinary negligence. The Attorney 
General nevertheless ruled that the reimbursement could not be 
required. The opinion may go too far, since the employee was 
intoxicated. Even so, it is based upon a good deal of experience. 
The icfea of employee·reimbursement was "tried out during the 
earlier yea:r:s of our national existence .... Numerous suits were 
filed by private parties against officers and employees of the gov-
ernment and the judgments obtained were sometimes in amounts 
so large as to threaten financial ruin and bankruptcy. . . . [T]he 
Congress repeatedly came to the relief of the erring officers and 
employees. Thus, in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 
Cranch 64, 124 [1804], the Supreme Court held Captain Murray, 
of the U.S. Frigate Constellation, personally liable for a tortious 
seizure, but the Congress made provision for his relief by the act 
of January 31, 1805, c. 12, 6 Stat. 56."46 The Attorney General 
added: "Of course, the employee may be subjected to suitable 
discipline, including dismissal, if warranted."47 
Another kind of development showing the temper of the times 
is the growing body of state legislation providing that state and 
local governmental units may or must indemnify employees who 
have been held liable in tort on account of acts within their em-
ployment.48 
The problem came to the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Gilman.49 The single question was whether the government could 
recover indemnity from an employee after it had been held liable 
44 66 Stat. Al43 (1952). The amount was designated as sufficient to satisfy the 
judgment and court costs recovered by the claimant against the driver of the mail truck. 
41140 Op. Atty. Gen. 38 (1941). 
46Id. at 40. 
47Id. at 41. 
48 For a discussion of this state legislation, see Davis, "Tort Liability of Governmental 
Units," 40 MINN. L. REv. 751 at 764-766 (1956). 
49 347 U.S. 507 (1954). 
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under the Tort Claims Act for the employee's negligence in driv-
ing a government automobile. The Court unanimously held for 
the employee. The Tort Claims Act provided only that a judg-
ment against the United States is "a complete bar" 'to any action 
by the claimant against the employee.50 The Court found its an-
swer neither in the statute nor in the legislative history, although 
in a footnote it did set forth supporting legislative history.51 It 
declared that the issue was "a matter on which Congress has not 
taken a position. It presents questions of policy on which Congress 
has not spoken. "52 
The basis for the Court's decision is thus a general one and 
the reasons may be equally or largely applicable to employees of 
state and local governments. The Court was unimpressed with the 
authority of the common-law principle that a private employer has 
a right of indemnity against an employee whose negligence has 
made the employer liable. Instead, it recognized: "Here a complex 
of relations between federal agencies and their staffs is involved."58 
The Court spoke of "Tenure, retirement, discharge, veterans' 
preferences, the responsibility of the United States to some em-
ployees for negligent acts of other employees," and then it said: 
"Discipline of the employee, the exactions which may be made 
of him, the merits or demerits he may suffer, the rate of his pro-
motion are of great consequence to those who make government 
service their career. The right of the employer to sue the employee 
is a form of discipline. . . . Moreover, the suits that would be 
brought would haul the employee to court and require him to 
find a lawyer, to face his employer's charge, and to submit 'to the 
ordeal of a trial. The time out for the trial and its preparation, 
plus the out-of-pocket expenses, might well impose on the em-
ployee a heavier financial burden than the loss of his seniority or 
a demotion in rank. . . . Perhaps the cost in the morale and effi-
ciency of employees would be too high a price to pay for the rule 
f · d · "54 o m emmty .... 
50 28 u.s.c. (1952) §2676. 
51347 U.S. 507 at 511-513, n. 2 (1954). Mr. Francis M. Shea, then Assistant Attorney 
General, explained the Government's position. The Court quotes long excerpts. The 
key sentence is: "If the Government has satisfied a claim which is made on account of a 
collision between a truck carrying mail and a private car, that should, in our judgment, 
be the end of it." The question was put: "Is there any requirement that [the] employee 
-should in any way respond to the Government if it has to pay for the injury, in the 
event of gross negligence?" Mr. Shea replied: "Not if he is a Government employee. 
Under those circumstances, the remedy is to fire the employee." · 
52 Id. at 511. 
SSibid. 
54 Id. at 509-510. 
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Of course, the Gilman problem cannot properly be considered 
without taking into account the prevalence of liability insurance. 
The Court did not see fit to state the facts as to the employee's 
insurance, even though the government's brief pointed out that 
"the practice of the Government has been to restrict such claims, 
usually to situations in which the employee at fault is covered by 
liability insurance," and quoted the applicable regulation of the 
Coast and Geodetic Survey authorizing a requirement that all 
employees obtain at their own expense liability insurance for dam-
age incurred while driving government vehicles. The Court said: 
"Perhaps the suits which would be instituted under the rule which 
petitioner asks would mostly be brought only when the employee 
carried insurance. But the decision we could fashion could have 
no such limitations, since we deal only with a rule of indemnity 
which is utterly independent of any underwriting of the lia-
bility."55 The decision is thus an especially strong one, in that it 
applies even when the employee is covered by insurance. One 
effect of the decision is to relieve government employees of the 
payment of premiums to cover accidents in operation of govern-
ment vehicles. 
Perhaps the most doubtful aspect of the Gilman decision re-
lates to the choice the Supreme Court made between judicial and 
administrative determination of the question of indemnity. The 
common law would in effect leave the question of indemnity to 
administrative determination in each case. The Court's decision 
foreclosed indemnity even in a case in which special circumstances 
call for indemnity. 
Perhaps the Gilman case should not control if the employee 
was driving while drunk, or if the tort was intentional. Perhaps 
the common law should continue in a case like Brady v. Roosevelt 
S.S. Co.,56 where the agent operating a vessel on behalf of the 
Maritime Commission was a corporation. Special problems will 
have to be solved when an officer is bonded, so that the real defend-
ant may be a surety company,57 and care will have to be taken to 
avoid upsetting the effectiveness of liability insurance, which may 
sometimes be inoperative unless the employee is liable.58 If the 
55 Id. at 510. 
56 317 U.S. 575 (1943) • 
.57 In Rogers v. The Marshal, 68 U.S. 644 at 650 (1863), a marshal was held liable 
for misconduct of his deputy. The suit was against the marshal and the sureties on his 
official bond. 
58 See note, 34 NEB. L R.Ev. 78 (1954). 
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doctrine is to be developed that an enterprise should bear the 
losses from unintentional harms that normally grow out of the en-
terprise, many problems of line-drawing will need to be solved. 
An underlying problem will be whether the lines should be drawn 
by administrative officers or by courts. 
The cases imposing liability upon public employees who per-
form non-discretionary functions are scarce, probably for the rea-
son that such defendants are seldom financially responsible.59 
A superior officer is not liable for the tort of a subordinate 
even when the subordinate would be liable for his own tort.60 But 
for directing or participating in a tort of a subordinate a superior 
may be liable.61 Liability may be imposed on the superior for im-
proper performance of a non-delegable duty.62 And a superior 
may be liable for choosing or keeping incompetent or vicious 
subordinates. 63 
59 The driver of a school bus is liable for his own negligent driving. Hansley v. Tilton, 
234 N.C. 3, 65 S.E. (2d) 300 (1951); Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 197 S.E. 527 (1938). A 
public school teacher is liable for fault in administering medical treatment to a student. 
Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A. (2d) 468 (1942). A physician employed in 
a state university infirmary may be liable. Davie v. University of California, 66 Cal. App. 
689, 227 P. 247 (1924). A demurrer was held wrongly sustained in a suit for damages by a 
pupil against a school superintendent, principal, supervisor, janitor, and members of a 
board of education. Whitt v. Reed, (Ky. 1951) 239 S.W. (2d) 489. A coroner has been 
held liable for false arrest and confinement to a mental hospital, even though he acted 
in good faith and without malice. O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 227 La. 262, 79 S. (2d) 87 (1955). 
Failing to put a name on a primary election ballot may be ministerial, so that public 
employees will be liable. Schwartz v. Heffernan, 304 N.Y. 474, 109 N.E. (2d) 68 (1952); 
Larson v. Marsh, 144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W. (2d) 189 (1944). 
60 The Supreme Court has explained: "Competent persons could not be found to fill 
positions of the kind, if they knew they would be held liable for all the torts and wrongs 
committed by a large body of subordinates, in the discharge of duties which it would be 
utterly impossible for the superior officer to discharge in person." Robertson v. Sichel, 
127 U.S. 507 at 515 (1888). Accord: Armacost v. Conservation Commission, (S.D. W.Va. 
1954) 126 F. Supp. 414; Jones v. Kennedy, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 40, cert. den. 314 
U.S. 665 (1941); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Brightman, (8th Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 161; 
Marshall v. County of Los Angeles, 131 Cal. App. (2d) 812, 281 P. (2d) 544 (1955); Klam 
v. Boehm, 72 Idaho 259, 240 P. (2d) 484 (1952); Gray v. Wood, 75 R.I. 123, 64 A. (2d) ~ 
191 (1949); Reiter v. Illinois Nat. Cas. Co., 397 Ill. 141, 73 N.E. (2d) 412 (1947). 
By virtue of statutes, sheriffs are sometimes liable for acts of deputies. Magenheimer 
v. State, 120 Ind. 128, 90 N.E. (2d) 813 (1950); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Clark, 136 Tex. 
238, 150 S.W. (2d) 79 (1941). The surety bonds in these cases should not be overlooked. 
61 Wadsworth v. Middletown, 94 Conn. 435, 109 A. 246 (1920); Nunn v. Turner, 133 
Wash. 654, 234 P. 443 (1925). In Rich v. Warren, (6th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 198, an army 
major was held liable for injuries caused to a pedestrian when his driver negligently drove 
a government car, the theory of liability being the major's acquiescence or encouragement. 
62 Chambers v. Anderson, (6th Cir. 1932) 58 F. (2d) 151 (sheriff and deputy); Ulvestad 
v. Dolphin, 152 Wash. 580, 278 P. 681 (1929). 
63 Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. (2d) 226, 138 P. (2d) 12 (1943), a city manager and 
chief of police, and their bondsmen, were held liable for the acts of policemen in beating 
up and killing an inmate of a jail. 
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III. LIABILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS FOR FALSE ARREST AND 
RELATED TORTS 
If, as most judicial opinions seem to assume, a line must be 
drawn between discretionary and ministerial functions to deter-
mine whether a public officer or employee is immune from lia-
bility in tort, what kind of function does an ordinary policeman 
perform when he arrests an individual, searches his home or his 
pockets, imprisons him, and makes charges against him? 
From the standpoint of authority, the question is to some ex-
tent an open one, although the common-law tradition unquestion-
ably has been that a policeman is subject to tort liability as if he 
were a private individual. A policeman is, of course, privileged 
in various circumstances, but the problem of privilege must be 
distinguished from the problem of immunity, which arises only if 
the officer ·acts beyond his privilege. Thus, the officer has a privilege 
to make an arrest upon a warrant which is fair upon its face but 
in fact invalid. If the act the officer commits is unprivileged and 
tortious, he still may escape liability if he is immune. The im-
munity is the same for each officer, whether the tort is false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, or some other tort, although privilege may 
vary with the tort. The question we are here concerned with is 
immunity. The old cases uniformly assume that policemen are 
not immune from tort liability,64 and some of the recent ones do.ms 
A textwriter says: "Arrest under a warrant, or the levy of civil 
process, is considered a 'ministerial act,' for which the officer will 
be liable if he acts properly, but will be liable personally if he steps 
outside of his authority. . . . He will be liable if he mistakenly 
arrests another than the person named, or seizes property not 
covered by the writ. "66 The Restatement of Torts in dealing with 
malicious prosecution, for instance, recognizes the immunity for 
a "public prosecutor" but not for a "peace officer."67 But recent 
cases in both federal68 and state69 courts show a substantial inclina-
tion to reexamine the common-law tradition. 
64 Brock v. Stimson, 108 Mass. 520 (1871); Hefler v. Hunt, 120 Me. IO, 112 A. 675 (1921). 
65 Hughes v. Oreb, 36 Cal. (2d) 854, 228 P. (2d) 550 (1951); Mason v. Wrightson, 205 
Md. 481, 109 A. (2d) 128 (1954). 
66 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 107 (1955). 
67 Sec. 656 (d) (1938). 
68 An FBI agent was held immune in Cooper v. O'Connor, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 99 F. 
(2d) ll!5. 
611 E.g., White v. Towers, 37 Cal. (2d) 727, 235 P. (2d) 209 (1951). 
214 -MICHIGAN LAw REvmw [Vol. 55 
The problem is not one that can be resolved by inquiring into 
the meaning of words. If it were, the solution would be easy: when 
a policeman decides a question that may later divide an appellate 
court, he must be performing a "discretionary" function. Neither 
is the problem one that can be resolved by the over-simplified 
idea that an individual who commits a "wrong" must b~ held 
legally responsible for making decisions that a later tribunal holds 
to be mistaken. The problem is a highly practical one, for abuses 
by police officers are so widespread that estimates have been made 
that from one million to three and a half million illegal arrests 
are made annually,70 and that three-fourths of all arrests are il-
legal.71 The only sensible approach is to inquire what solution will 
most effectively promote our basic objective of developing a fair 
and efficient system of law enforcement involving a minimum of 
abuses. 
If the governmental unit is immune, the reasons for imposing 
liability upon the policeman for false arrest or illegal search and 
seizure may seem strong, for otherwise the plaintiff may be with-
out remedy. One might initially suppose that the way to minimize 
illegal arrests is by providing an effective remedy against the 
policeman, a remedy available to a plaintiff who has incentive to 
use it. An officer who knows that he will be personally liable will 
be careful to avoid false arrests and illegal searches. 
But this initial supposition is unsupported by experience. 
What happens in fact is that personal liability is so rarely imposed 
upon officers that abuses are unchecked,72 and, at the same time, 
that in the rare cases in which liability is imposed, the deterrence 
may be, or may be thought to be, too strong. If an officer resolves 
all doubts in favor of his own pocket book, the public interest in 
effective law enforcement is sure to suffer. Courts are usually aware 
of this danger. The Michigan court, for instance, has declared that 
"a police officer who acts in good faith in the line of duty should 
be protected even though overzealous in its discharge. . . . If 
possible, any doubt should be resolved in favor of an honest dis-
charge of duty by peace officers, and the courts should not place 
them in fear of responding in damages for the lawful and proper 
discharge of that duty."73 
70 Hall, "Police and Law in a Democratic Society," 28 IND. L. J. 133 at 152, 154 (1953). 
71 Warner, "Investigating the Law of Arrest," 26 A.B.A.J. 151 (1940). 
72 See Foote, "Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights," 39 MINN. 
L REv. 493 (1955), for an excellent account of the ineffectiveness of personal liability of 
officers when the plaintiff lacks completely clean hands. 
73 Odinetz v. Budds, 315 Mich. 512 at 518, 24 N.W. (2d) 193 (1946). 
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Especially enlightening case law is a line of recent decisions of 
the California Supreme Court, beginning with the 1951 decision 
in White v. Towers.74 Earlier the same year the same court in a 
suit against policemen for false imprisonment had held that "the 
liability of defendant officers depends upon whether they had 
reasonable cause for believing that plaintiff was the person guilty of 
taking the money."75 The whole question was one of privilege; 
lack of immunity was assumed. But in the White case the court said 
that the question was whether the defendant investigator for the 
Fish and Game Commission was "immune from civil liability for 
the alleged malicious prosecution." The court's reasoning in hold-
ing him immune has a good deal of persuasive force: "When the 
duty to investigate crime and to institute criminal proceedings is 
lodged with any public officer, it is for the best interests of the com-
munity as a whole that he be protected from harassment in the 
performance of that duty. The efficient functioning of our system 
of law enforcement is dependent largely upon the investigation 
of crime and the accusation of offenders by properly trained officers. 
A breakdown of this system at the investigative or accusatory level 
would wreak untold harm. . . . [Defendant] is entitled to the 
immunity from civil liability with which the law surrounds offi-
cials directly connected with the judicial processes."76 The court 
generalized about the many cases it cited, most of which involved 
prosecutors: "A review of the cases which have concerned the ap-
plication of the doctrine to law enforcement officers shows that the 
great majority of the courts have ruled in favor of the officers." 
Of the seven judges, three dissented, one declaring, "[T]he holding 
in this case is a major step toward statism."77 
In 1952 the same court seemingly applied the same doctrine 
to suits against a sheriff, five deputies, city manager, chief of police, 
three police officers, .and their respective sureties, for false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, assault and battery, and conspiracy and 
trespass. The somewhat unclear opinion was quite clear in assert-
ing: "Peace officers would be reluctant to make arrests for fear that 
they would be held liable for having made an honest and reason-
able mistake."78 A dissenting judge argued: "The majority of this 
court is, apparently, determined that no action for false arrest, 
74 37 Cal. (2d) 727, 235 P. (2d) 209 (1951). 
75 Hughes v. Oreb, 36 Cal. (2d) 854 at 857, 228 P. (2d) 550 (1951). 
76 37 Cal. (2d) 727 at 729-730. 
11 Id. at 738. 
78 Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. (2d) 315 at 321, 239 P. (2d) 876 (1952). 
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false imprisonment or malicious prosecution shall lie against any 
one connected with the enforcement of the law .... "79 
By 1955, however, the majority saw the lack of necessity for 
going all the way with the immunity doctrine. To protect a police 
officer from liability for exercising his judgment does not require 
that the officer be immune from liability for a clear violation of a 
clear rule. The court set aside a summary judgment for an officer 
where the allegation was that the officer made an arrest without a 
warrant for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence.80 
Then came a case involving a rather clear and serious abuse.81 
The officers held the plaintiff in jail three days, stated to reporters 
that he was held for suspicion of conspiracy to commit murder 
and that he was a member of a criminal gang and a mobster, al-
lowed photographers to take his picture, and then released him 
without filing a charge against him. The court of appeals had said: 
"To immunize peace officers and other public servants against 
claims resulting from errors of judgment while acting in the dis-
charge of duty is now an elementary principle .... Not to grant 
immunity against civil liability to a peace officer acting within the 
scope of his authority for the arrest and detention of a person rea-
sonably suspected of a felony would be to 'place every honest law 
enforcement officer under an unbearable handicap and would re-
dound to the detriment of the body politic.' "82 The Supreme 
Court did not deny this principle, but it found it inapplicable. 
Proof of the facts alleged, it unanimously held, puts the burden 
upon the defendants to show justification for the arrest. 
The California court is valiantly trying to work out the prob-
lem, with results that seem preferable to a blind following of the 
common-law tradition. But the court is unlikely to succeed in its 
objective of stamping out police abuses without impairing effec-
tive law enforcement, for it lacks the indispensable tool of provid-
ing incentives where incentives will have the most effect. Vast 
experience proves that police abuses thrive under a system of the-
oretical legal liability of officers. What is needed is to provide in-
centives to top officials, not merely to the policemen. If the lia-
bility were imposed upon the governmental unit, then the top 
officials, who are strongly motivated by threats to their budgets, 
79 Id. at 324. 
so Miller v. Glass, 44 Cal. (2d) 359, 282 P. (2d) 501 (1955). The clarity of the reasons 
for the shift is marred by the court's statement (at p. 362), after referring to malicious 
prosecution: "Different principles govern actions for false arrest and imprisonment, for 
the law expressly limits the arresting officer's authority." 
81 Dragna v. White, 45 Cal. (2d) 469, 289 P. (2d) 428 (1955). 
82Dragna v. White, (Cal. App. 1955) 280 P. (2d) 817 at 819. 
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would issue the orders that would be necessary to protect against 
tort liability. Policemen do not respond to the largely theoretical 
personal liability, which is sporadically imposed and which typi-
cally lags years behind the abuse. Policemen do respond to rules 
enforced by their superiors, for the enforcement may be steady, 
swift, and sure, and the penalties, including dismissal, may be 
geared to the practical needs. 
A recent Maryland case shows how unsatisfactory the system 
of personal liability can be in some circumstances.83 The Baltimore 
Commissioner of Police issued a general order that the police 
"search for possession of dangerous weapons on all persons coming 
under police suspicion." During two months, one hundred and 
twenty-nine taverns in one district were entered by the police and 
the male patrons "frisked" in a search for concealed weapons. The 
plaintiff, an attorney, refused to submit, and he was searched with-
out his consent. He sued the sergeant who was in charge of the 
searching squad. The Maryland court deemed itself bound by the 
common law that the sergeant was not relieved of liability by 
reason of his acting under the orders of his superior. But the court 
fixed the damages at one cent. Would an award of substantial 
damages have been desirable? Surely something would be wrong 
in a system in which a police sergeant would be personally pen-
alized for conscientiously carrying out the orders of his superior. 
A policeman should not be required to get legal advice before 
following orders. If sanctions are to be effective, they must be ap-
plied to those who give the orders, not to those who follow them. 
Even when affirmative orders are not given, the sanctions must 
be directed to the high officials who know about but do little or 
nothing to prevent the abuses. 
Personal liability of policemen is a hit-or-miss treatment of 
symptoms. The underlying disease can be effectively reached only 
by motivating the legislative and executive officers who determine 
policies. That can probably be done through a system of tort lia-
bility of governmental units. Other states need to study the results 
in New York, where state and local governmental units are liable 
for such torts as false arrest and false imprisonment.84 
Potentialities of surety bonds as a tool for achieving wanted 
results are given little heed. If bonds were required under which 
sureties were ultimately liable for officers' abuses, not only would 
83 Mason v. Wrightson, 205 Md. 481, 109 A. (2d) 128 (1954). 
84 Bonnau v. State, 278 App. Div. 181, 104 N.Y.S. (2d) 364 (1951), affd. 303 N.Y. 721, 
103 N.E. (2d) 340 (1951); Tierney v. State, 266 App. Div. 434, 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 877 (1943), 
affd. 292 N.Y. 523, 54 N.E. (2d) 207 (1944). 
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injured parties be protected but the companies would be impelled 
to prevent the abuses.85 In the line of California cases just re-
viewed, the one case in which sureties were named as defendants 
was a case in which liability was not imposed.86 The result could 
have been different if the sureties had had the ultimate liability. 
IV. WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS TORTS 
An attitude that has often affected the law of tort liability of 
officers was expressed by an English court in 1703: "If publik of-
ficers will infringe men's rights, they ought to pay greater damages 
than other men, to deter and hinder other officers from like of-
fences. "87 . If ever this attitude is fully justified, it must be when 
an officer acts willfully and maliciously in inflicting injury upon 
the plaintiff. Yet the law is that officers are often immune from 
liability even when they act maliciously. Why? 
The reasons must be found in something other than the simple 
question of what is justice as between the willful and malicious of-
ficer and the innocent plaintiff who has suffered injury. The prob-
lem is indeed much more complex. If liability is imposed in one case 
in which the evidence clearly shows malice, then later plaintiffs 
who are disgruntled by official action may make charges of malice 
against conscientious officers, and the result may be that the po-
tentiality of such charges, and of lawsuits based upon them, will 
become an extraneous influence upon the determinations that the 
officers must make. At all events, this is the essence of the problem. 
The foundation for the federal law is a unanimous and clear 
decision of the Supreme Court in 1896 in Spalding v. Vilas.88 The 
Court affirmed an order sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's 
declaration, even though the defendant Postmaster General was 
alleged to have injured the plaintiff "with malicious intent," and 
to have made false statements which "were unnecessary, malicious, 
and without reasonable or probable cause, and intended to de-
An Illinois statute requires the city of Chicago to indemnify policemen for any judg-
ment against them as a result of their official activities, except when the injury results 
from their willful misconduct. Ill. Stat. (1955) c. 24, §1-15. From the standpoint of simple 
justice as between the city and the policeman who is guilty of willful misconduct, making 
the policeman pay a judgment against him is obviously sound.· But from the standpoint 
of providing incentives where incentives are needed, in order to minimize willful abuses 
by police officers, much can be said for making the city liable even for the willful torts. 
85 For an excellent discussion of the successes of surety companies in avoiding liability 
on police officers' bonds, see Hall, "The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social 
Problems," 3 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 345 (1936). 
86 Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. (2d) 315, 239 P. (2d) 876 (1952). 
87 Chief Justice Holt in Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938 at 956, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 
(1703). 
ss 161 U.S. 483 (1896). 
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ceive." The Court first found that the Postmaster General's action 
was not beyond the scope of his official duties, and then it asked: 
"[C]an this action be maintained because of the allegation that 
what that officer did was done maliciously?"89 Relating the prob-
lem to that of liability of judges, the Court held: "The motive 
that impelled him [the Postmaster General] to do that of which 
the plaintiff complains is ... immaterial."90 The Court succinctly 
stated the reason: "In exercising the functions of his office, the 
head of an executive department, keeping within the limits of his 
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives 
that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the sub-
ject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages."91 
An instructive modern case is Gregoire v. Biddle.92 The plain-
tiff was imprisoned as an alien enemy for more than four and a 
half years, and he sued two successive Attorneys General of the 
United States, two successive directors of the enemy alien control 
unit of the Department of Justice, and the district director of im-
migration at Ellis Island, alleging that the defendants "conspired 
together and maliciously and wilfully entered into a scheme to 
deprive plaintiff ... of his liberty." The lower court dismissed 
the complaint on the ground that defendants had an absolute im-
munity even if their unlawful acts had been induced only by 
personal ill will. The court of appeals held that the complaint 
could not stand, even though the court read it to mean that the 
defendants "acted altogether from personal spite and had been 
fully aware that they had no legal warrant for arresting or deport-
ing the plaintiff." Judge Learned Hand declared for the court: 
"The immunity is absolute and is grounded upon principles of 
public policy .... It does indeed go without saying that an offi-
cial, :who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen 
upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with 
the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he 
may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such 
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. 
The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know 
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, 
and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, 
to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its out-
come, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or 
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. 
89 Id. at 493. 
90 Id. at 499. 
91 Id. at 498. 
92 (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579. 
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As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a bal-
ance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this 
instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed 
the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try 
to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."93 
The Spalding and the Gregoire cases are representative of cases 
in the federal courts.94 When the courts regard the functions of 
the officers as "discretionary," demurrers or motions to dismiss 
are sustained, even though the officers have allegedly acted will-
fully and maliciously. Plaintiffs are thus denied the opportunity 
to prove their allegations. This means that no matter how con-
vincing the evidence of malice may be, the officers are immune. 
This result may be basically a failure of the legal system. What 
a federal court says-what Judge Learned Hand in the Gregoire 
case says-is in effect that the plaintiff must be denied justice as 
against the defendant, because doing justice will produce an 
unwanted effect in other cases. Must we acquiesce in the melan-
choly conclusion that we are unable, without unduly sacrificing 
other interests, to do justice to a deserving plaintiff who is in fact 
the victim of official malice? This question is a truly challenging 
one. 
The first step is to recognize that such cases as Spalding and 
Gregoire almost surely do not involve injustice to the plaintiffs. 
93 Id. at 580-581. 
94 The cases sustaining motions to dismiss where malice of the officer is alleged are 
numerous. Some of the most important include Glass v. Ickes, (D.C. Cir. 1940) 117 F. (2d) 
273, cert. den. 311 U.S. 718 (1941) (Secretary of Interior alleged to have willfully and 
maliciously published defamatory statements); Lang v. Wood, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 
211, cert. den. 302 U.S. 686 (1937) (Attorney General, members of parole board, warden 
of prison, and director of prisons alleged to have "maliciously, feloniously, and arbitrarily" 
imprisoned plaintiff); Cooper v. O'Connor, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 135 (suit for 
malicious prosecution against Comptroller of the Currency; receiver of a national bank, 
general counsel of a division of the Treasury Department and general counsel for the 
comptroller, deputy comptroller, United States attorney, assistant United States attorney, 
and special agent for the FBI, for malicious prosecution; court holds "even the absence 
of probable cause and the presence of malice are not sufficient to impose liability upon 
such an officer who acts within the general scope of his authority"); Jones v. Kennedy, 
(D.C. Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 40, cert. den. 314 U.S. 665 (1941) (conspiracy and malice of 
members of SEC); Gibson v. Reynolds, (8th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 95 at 97, cert. den. 337 
U.S. 925 (1949) (draft officials; "some officers of government must be and are afforded 
personal immunity from civil actions for damages for acts done in relation to matters 
committed to them by law although probable cause be absent and malice be present in 
their enforcement of the law''); Laughlin v. Rosenman, (D.C. Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 838 
(President's confidential assistant, special assistant to the Attorney General, director of 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, and warden of penitentiary "all conspiring together"); Taylor 
v. Glotfelty, (6th Cir. 1952) 201 F. (2d) 51 (psychiatrist at medical center for prisoners); 
Baker v. Mueller, (7th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 180 (members of town board, building 
inspector, health inspector, city attorney, and plumbing inspector). 
For a rather full review of English and American case law before 1926, see the elaborate 
opinion in Yaselli v. Goff, (2d Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 396, affirming dismissal of a complaint 
in a suit for malicious prosecution against a special assistant to the Attorney General. 
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The Court's opinion in Spalding carefully demonstrated that the 
Postmaster General was acting within the authority conferred and 
was carrying out the congressional intent; despite the theory of 
demurrer, the Court clearly did not take literally the allegations 
of malice. In the Gregoire case, the reasons for disbelieving the 
allegation of malice could not have escaped alert judges; three 
times a judge had denied Gregoire habeas corpus, thereby accept-
ing the view of the officers that he was a German. Gregoire was 
born in Lorraine when it was a part of Germany but came to the 
United States after it had become a part of France. The writ that 
finally released Gregoire was affirmed by a court of appeals, one 
judge of which revealed that he had previously asserted the view 
that one in Gregoire's circumstances should be regarded as a Ger-
man.95 Even though a reasonable decision, about which judges may_ 
differ, could conceivably be actuated by malice, Gregoire's allega-
tion seems quite unconvincing. 
In most of the cases in which motions to dismiss are granted, 
the allegations of malice are only in general terms and may easily 
be interpreted to mean no more than that the plaintiff believes 
strongly that the officer's determination is erroneous. The prob-
lem is to identify the rare case in which official action has truly 
been malicious. Can a court do that without the disadvantages of a 
trial? The court could treat the motion to dismiss as one for sum-
mary judgment96 and could enter judgment for the defendant 
unless the plaintiff's affidavit satisfies the court that a trial on the 
issue of malice is appropriate, as it would be only in the rare case 
in which the charge of malice seems to be justified. 
Such a procedure might cut far into Judge Learned Hand's 
remark in the Gregoire opinion97 that "it is impossible to know 
whether the claim [ of malice] is well founded until the case has 
been tried." Something short of trial can show whether the claim 
of malice has real substance or whether it is only a vigorous as-
sertion of error. 
The next question is whether officials should be forced to sub-
mit to the burden of a trial whenever the plaintiff's affidavit is 
95 United States ex rel. Gregoire v. Watkins, (2d Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 137. An 
account of the earlier proceedings is given in the opinion, as well as the previous view 
of one of the judges. 
96 Under the 1946 amendments to rules 12 (b) and 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a motion to dismiss or a motion f.or judgment on the pleadings may be treated 
as a motion for summary judgment. Alternative procedures that might be appropriate 
in some cases include interrogatories and discovery. 
97 Gregoire v. Biddle, (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579 at 581, cert. den. 339 U.S. 949 
(1950). 
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found sufficient. Perhaps judges and administrative officers who 
perform judicial functions should not be. But the manual worker 
who commits a willful tort is and probably should be. personally 
liable, and no clear line separates the employee whose functions 
are deemed discretionary. Probably the line should be higher on 
the scale if the officer acts maliciously than if he acts negligently. 
Instead of a sharp line dividing officers who are immune from offi-
cers who are not immune, a court might find useful the summary 
judgment procedure for officers whose classification is doubtful. 
State law of liability of officers for malicious action is probably 
essentially in accord with federal,98 although in an occasional state 
case liability is imposed,99 and although the state courts in cases 
not involving malice are accustomed to asserting that discretionary 
officers are not liable in absence of malice.100 
V. EXCESS OF JURISDICTION 
The one factor that is most likely to win a suit for damages 
against an officer who performs discretionary functions is not mal-
ice but excess of jurisdiction. For under the case law, surprisingly 
98 Wilson v. Hirst, 67 Ariz. 197, 193 P. (2d) 461 (1948) (court affirms dismissal of 
complaint for wrongful discharge of plaintiffs, though action allegedly taken "wickedly, 
maliciously"; court relates problem to immunity of judges); Gottschalk v. Shepperd, 65 
N.D. 544, 260 N.W. 573 (1935) (demurrer to complaint sustained, though alleged presi• 
dent of state university had personal malice in discharging university professor); Nadeau 
v. Marshessault, 112 Vt. 309, 24 A. (2d) 352 (1942) (overseer of poor acts judicially in 
administering direct relief; demurrer sustained though malice alleged); Wasserman v. 
Kenosha, 217 Wis. 223, 258 N.W. 857 (1935) (demurrer sustained, though alleged that 
officers who revoked building permit were actuated by "their own personal, financial, 
political office-holding and election interests"; court declared that an official exercising 
discretionary powers "cannot be made personally liable upon an allegation that he acted 
maliciously''); Andersen v. Bishop, 304 Mass. 396, 23 N.E. (2d) 1003 (1939) (district 
attorney and assistant not liable though malice alleged);' Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 
188, 88 A. (2d) 892 (1952) (state attorney general immune though malice alleged); 
Frazier v. Moffatt, 108 Cal. App. (2d) 379, 239 P. (2d) 123 (1951) (justice of the peace 
not liable even if acted maliciously). · 
99 Larson v. Marsh. 144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W. (2d) 189 (1944) (officers and their bonding 
companies liable for failure to indicate plaintiff's home town on primary election ballot, 
where duty regarded as ministerial); Schwartz v. Heffernan, 304 N.Y. 474, 109 N.E. (2d) 
68 (1952) (liable for failure to place name on primary election ballot); Hedgepeth v. 
Swanson, 223 N.C. 442, 27 S.E. (2d) 122 (1943) (error to sustain demurrer alleging sheriff 
acted maliciously, where surety named as defendant). 
100 Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1 at 7, 68 S.E. (2d) 783 (1952): "The rule in such cases 
is that an official may not be held liable unless it be alleged and proved that his act, or 
failure to act, was corrupt or malicious." Galli v. Brown, IIO Cal. App. (2d) 764 at 776, 
243 P. (2d) 920 (1952): " ••• not liable when he acts in good faith within the general 
scope of his authority, without malice, corruption or sinister motives." Hester v. Miller, 
8 N.J. 81 at 84, 83 A. (2d) 773 (1951): "The rule ••• is ·that where there is no fraud 
or malice a public officer is exempt from civil action when called upon in behalf of the 
public to exercise his discretion." 
See also People ex rel. Schreiner v. Courtney, 380 Ill. 171, 43 N.E. (2d) 982 (1942); 
Tyrell v. Burke, 110 N.J.L. 225, 164 A. 586 (1933); Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 
15, 8 S.E. (2d) 871 (1940). 
1956] OFFICERS' TORT LIABILITY 223 
enough, an officer may be liable not only in absence of malice but 
even in absence of negligence, if he was mistaken with respect to 
facts that may be regarded as jurisdictional. The proposition that 
the same officer exercising the same functions may be immune from 
liability for malicious action where no jurisdictional mistake is 
involved ·but may be subject to liability for a reasonable and non-
negligent mistake as to jurisdiction may seem so incongruous as 
to be almost capricious, and yet a good deal of case law supports 
this proposition. Such case law rests largely upon historical acci-
dent and sterile logic and seems to have little to do with common 
sense. At the same time, such case law has not been followed by 
the federal courts, and the trend in the state courts may be away 
from it. 
A leading case is the 1891 Massachusetts decision in Miller v. 
H orton,101 in which Justice Holmes wrote the opinion. Members 
of a board of health found that a horse had glanders and ordered 
it destroyed. The statute provided for such action "in all cases of 
farcy or glanders." The judge before whom the case was tried 
found that the horse did not have glanders. Justice Holmes, 
for the court, said that the statute limited the power of the officers 
to "a horse that really has the glanders,''102 because "the literal and, 
as we think, the true, construction ... [is] that the authority and 
jurisdiction of the commissioners to condemn the plaintiff's horse 
under [ the statute] was conditional upon its actually having the 
glanders. If this be so, their order would not protect the defendants 
in a case where the commissioners acted outside their juris-
diction. ''103 
The problem, according to the court's analysis, is the easy one 
of reading the statutory words literally and applying those words 
to the facts found by the trial judge. The court was apparently 
unaware of any problem resulting from the facts that the trial 
judge probably did not examine the horse and probably was not 
trained in veterinary science, whereas th$! board members may 
have examined the horse and may have been trained in veterinary 
science. The facts are said to be "really" or "actually" what the 
trial judge has found them to be, not what the board has found 
them to be, even though the legislative body has put the fact-find-
ing power in the board and not in the judge. The court's only 
reason for refusing to interpret the statute to mean that the offi-
cers had power to kill a horse they reasonably found to have gland-
101152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891). 
102 Id. at 542. 
103 Id. at 548. 
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ers was that the legislative body said" ... cases of. . glanders." 
The court was not wholly unaware of the practical consequences 
of requiring the officers to act at their peril, for it expressly rejected 
the argument that "few people could be found to carry out orders 
on these terms."104 
The decision in Miller v. Horton means that an officer may 
be completely without fault and still be liable. The officer's action 
may be reasonable, prudent, and careful, and the officer still may 
be liable for damages if he makes a reasonable mistake. Further-
more, the officer may be personally liable even if his finding that 
the horse has glanders is entirely correct, for, in a practical sense, 
the test of the officer's liability is not the existence of the disease 
but what the court finds afterwards. 
Justice Holmes did not mention a prominent Connecticut case 
that had been decided just eight years earlier-a case in which the 
court was guided by practicalities instead of by wooden literalism 
and empty logic. In Raymond v. Fish,105 members of the board 
of health were held not liable for ordering the destruction of valu-
able oyster brush, even though they were assumed to be mistaken 
in believing that the oyster brush contributed to the spread of 
scarlet fever and diphtheria. The statute provided that the board 
"shall examine into all nuisances and sources of filth injurious to 
the public health, and cause to be removed all filth found within 
the to"wn which in their judgment shall endanger the health of the 
inhabitants." The court did not reason, as in Miller v. Horton, 
that the statute authorized only the examination of "nuisances 
and sources of filth" and the removal of "filth" and that the oyster 
brush was neither a nuisance nor filth and that therefore the board 
acted beyond its jurisdiction. Instead, the court observed that the 
object of the statute was to preserve public health: "If the board of 
health are to decide at their peril, they will not decide at all. . . . 
[D]uty, hampered. by a liability for damages for errors committed 
in its discharge, would become a motive of very little power."106 
The problem, the court thought, was which decision would best 
carry out the basic purpose of protecting the public health. In one 
deft sentence, the court escaped the logical trap of whether the 
oyster brush "really" or "actually" contributed to the contagious 
diseases: "The statute does not mean to destroy property which is 
not in fact a nuisance, but who shall decide whether it is so?"107 
104 Id. at 542. 
105 51 Conn. 80 (1888). 
106 Id. at 97. 
107 Id. at 96-97. 
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The federal courts have generally escaped the logical trap of 
the Miller v. Horton doctrine. The Supreme Court has seemingly 
understood from an early time that for purposes of tort liability, 
a determination of facts affecting jurisdiction is no different from 
a determination of any other facts. Thus, in Bradley v. Fisher108 
in 1871, the Court declared: "A distinction must be here ob-
served between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all 
jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no 
jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is an 
usurped authority. . . . But where jurisdiction over the subject-
matter is invested by law in the judge, . . . the manner and extent 
in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much 
questions for his determination as any other questions .... "109 
In 1896 the Court applied the same principle to the Postmaster 
General: "As in the case of a judicial officer, we recognize a distinc-
tion between action taken by the head of a department in refer-
ence to matters which are manifestly or palpably beyond his au-
thority, and action having more or less connection with the general 
matters committed by law to his control or supervision."110 The 
modern attitude of the federal courts is the same and is shown in 
the many cases granting motions to dismiss even when malice is 
alleged. The proposition that a statute never confers jurisdiction 
upon an officer to act maliciously is perfectly logical, but the fed-
eral courts are able to look beyond_ logic to practicality.111 For 
instance, Judge Learned Hand in the Gregoire opinion112 paid 
no heed to the argument that the officers acted "without any au-
thority of law" in imprisoning the plaintiff as an enemy alien. 
Since the plaintiff had been judicially determined to be a French-
man, the officers had no authority to imprison him as an alien 
enemy. But the court held that even if the officers "acted alto-
gether from personal spite and had been fully aware that they had 
no legal warrant for arresting or deporting the plaintiff,"113 still 
1os 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 335 (1872). 
109 Id. at 351-352. 
110 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 at 498 (1896). What may be the most significant 
departure from Spalding v. Vilas in the federal courts is a dictum, which apparently has 
been without influence in later cases, in North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 
211 U.S. 306 at 316 (1908). The suit was for an injunction, not for damages, concerning 
official destruction of unwholesome poultry. The Court declared: "If a party cannot get 
his hearing in advance of the seizure and destruction he has the right to have it after-
ward, which right may be claimed upon the trial in an action brought for the destruction 
of his property, and in that action those who destroyed it can only successfully defend if 
the jury shall find the fact of unwholesomeness as claimed by them." 
111 Nearly all the federal cases cited in the preceding section, dealing with willful 
and malicious torts, are here in point. 
112 Gregoire v. Biddle, (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579. 
113 Id. at 580. 
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they were not personally liable. To the argument that the officers, 
by reason of personal malice, were necessarily acting beyond the 
authority conferred, Judge Learned Hand responded: "A mo-
ment's reflection shows, however, that that cannot be the meaning 
of the limitation without defeating the whole doctrine. What is 
meant by saying that the officer must be acting within his power 
cannot be more than that the occasion must be such as would 
have justified the act, if he had been using his power for any of 
the purposes on whose account it was vested in him."114 What a 
contrast with the empty logic of Miller v. Horton. 
Falling helplessly into the logical trap of Miller v. Horton, the 
Mississippi court has picturesquely protested against the position 
the federal courts take: "We cannot grasp the conception that non-
existence can be less than nonexistence, or that there can be dif-
ferent kinds of nonexistence, or that that which is absent can be 
more absent."116 The court's statement is sound only if it is in-
terpreted literally: the court cannot grasp the conception. 
The doctrine of Miller v. Horton is followed in a good many 
state decisions116 and it is rejected in a good many.117 The doctrine, 
114 Id. at 581. 
115 National Surety Co. v. Miller, 155 Miss. 115 at 127, 124 S. 251 (1929). 
116 A leading case is Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N.W. 942 (1904), expressly 
overruling Fath v. Koeppel, 72 Wis. 289, 39 N.W. 539 (1888). But one may wonder 
whether the authority of the Fath case is to some extent revived by Wasserman v. Kenosha, 
217 Wis. 223, 258 N.W. 857 (1935). The Lowe case imposes liability for a reasonable 
mistake as to whether a steer had anthrax. The Fath case held an officer not liable for 
destruction of fish thought unwholesome, the court saying (at 293) that "a judicial officer 
is not responsible in an action for damages . . • however erroneously, negligently, ig-
norantly, corruptly, or maliciously he may act. •. .'' The Wasserman case held officers 
not liable for cancelling a building permit, quoting with approval from the Fath opinion. 
Pearson v. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 29 N.E. 854 (1891), is a prominent case holding officers 
liable, although they acted carefully and reasonably in destroying allegedly diseased animals. 
In Town of Randolph v. Ketchum, 117 Vt. 468, 94 A. (2d) 410 (1953), an overseer 
of the poor was held liable to a neighboring town, on the theory that the overseer 
exceeded his authority in taking a poor person to the plaintiff town: "When a public 
officer goes outside the scope of his authority or duty, he is not entitled to protection 
because of his office, but is liable for his acts like any private individual." Id. at 474. 
A member of a police jury who acts pursuant to an unlawful delegation of power 
may be personally liable. Strahan v. Fussell, 218 La. 682, 50 S. (2d) 805 (1951). A sheriff 
is liable for reasonable mistake in levying on or taking possession of the goods of the 
wrong person. Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. 334 (1865); Phillips v. Barker, (Okla. 1954) 269 
P. (2d) 337; Choukas v. Severyns, 3 Wash. (2d) 71, 99 P. (2d) 942 (1940); Atlantic 
.Finance Corp. v. Galvam, 311 Mass. 49, 39 N.E. (2d) 951 (1942). 
117 In addition to Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80 (1883), discussed above in this 
,section, and the Fath and Wasserman cases of the preceding note, all the holdings of the 
federal courts are against liability, as well as such state cases as McGuire v. Amyx, 317 
Mo. 1061, 297 S.W. 968 (1927) (health officer not liable for sending healthy person to 
pest house, though "jurisdiction"); Wright v. White, 166 Ore. 136, 110 P. (2d) 948 (1941) 
(lack of jurisdiction to prosecute without probable cause does not make officer liable); 
Sweeney v. Young, 82 N.H. 159 at 163, 131 A. 155 (1925) (holding officers not liable for 
unlawful dismissal, court declares principle: "When the officer makes an erroneous 
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for some unexplained and probably unexplainable reason, has a 
somewhat stronger application to property rights than to personal 
rights. For instance, even though a plaintiff who is wrongfully 
quarantined may be more seriously damaged than one whose 
property is wrongfully destroyed, under the case law he is less 
likely to recover damages from the officer.118 In what may be the 
most extreme application of the doctrine, the Massachusetts court 
holds that officers act beyond their jurisdiction and therefore be-
come personally liable if their only fault is failure to comply with 
a procedural requirement: "The full performance of all conditions 
established by the statute are essential prerequisites to the juris-
diction of the municipal council over the subject-matter of the 
removal of an officer .... The municipal council was clothed with 
the power of removal of city officers so long as there was conformity 
to the requirements of the law. When the members ceased to 
comply with the law they were acting outside their official capacity 
and were subjected to responsibility as individuals."119 
If the law on liability of officers for acting in excess of jurisdic-
tion is somewhat unsatisfactory,120 the difficulty lies largely in the 
principle of sovereign irresponsibility. A court that is compelled 
to choose between letting an innocent plaintiff bear the loss from 
improper destruction of his property and imposing liability upon 
an innocent officer who has made a reasonable mistake is sure to 
make an undesirable decision no matter which way it holds, for 
no solution can be just to both parties, except the obvious solution 
of allowing the loss to be borne by the public, which gets the bene-
fit of the program the officer is administering and should therefore 
pay for the mistakes that are normal, natural, and expected. 
preliminary decision that he has jurisdiction, and then acts in pursuance of the error, 
liability depends upon his right to pass upon the jurisdictional question. If he goes out• 
side his general authority, he is not protected for the consequences of his action. If 
within his general authority his erroneous exercise of it is due to special reasons of 
jurisdictional invalidity, he is protected.'') 
Even in Massachusetts, a mayor has been held not liable for damages for denying an 
application for a license. Jaffarian v. Murphy, 280 Mass. 402, 183 N.E. 110 (1932). 
118 Holding officers not liable for wrongful quarantine: Crayton v. Larabee, 220 N.Y. 
493, 116 N.E. 355 (1917); Beeks v. Dickinson County, 131 Iowa 244, 108 N.W. 311 (1906). 
But compare Barry v. Smith, 191 Mass. 78, 77 N.E. 1099 (1906). 
119 Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell, 233 Mass. 174 at 183, 123 N.E. 615 (1919). 
See the rather full discussion of Massachusetts cases in the opinion. A later case to some-
what the same effect, though less extreme, is Forbes v. Kane, 316 Mass. 207, 55 N.E. (2d) 
220 (1944). 
120 The congeries of rules concerning liability of officers take on an additional flavor 
of artificiality and arbitrariness when they are put into the format of a Restatement. 
The rules seem far from consistent. See TORTS R.EsTATEMENT §§12li, 202e, 204e, 262, 265, 
269, 271, 275, 278b, 601, 645, 656, 888, and 890f (1934-1939). The supplements of 1948 
and 1954 show no change and hardly any citation of these provisions by the courts. 
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VI. OFFICERS' LIABILITY u NDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
Because law normally develops in a rather plodding fashion, 
only occasionally can .one discern in a whole body of cases a clash 
of ideas or doctrine that partakes of the dramatic. A rather excit-
ing legal drama is the story since 1944 of the rise and partial 
decline of the Civil Rights Act of I 871 as a basis for recovering 
damages against state officers. At one time-about_ 1950-the 
traditional immunity of officers seemed to be crumbling at an 
alarming rate, whether the officers exercised legislative, judicial, 
executive, or administrative power. The villain in the drama was 
the drastic language of the act, which had been designed in 1871 
to resolve post-Civil War problems. But the heroes of the story, 
the federal judges, resorted to their powerful weapon of creative 
law-making through interpretation, and finally triumphed. The 
statute, which the Supreme Court has characterized as "loosely 
and blindly drafted in the first instance,"121 has succumbed to 
strong interpretation that rests upon little but practical judgment 
about practical needs. 
The Civil Rights Act, in its main provision concerning civil 
liability, provides: "Every person who, under color of_ any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."122 
Other provisions created civil liability for denial ~f equal protec-
tion,123 and created criminal liability for designated willful ac-
tion.124 
The modern expansion of civil liability of officers began in 
1944 in Snowden v. Hughes125 in which the Supreme Court dis-
missed a complaint brought against officers but nevertheless 
breathed life into the Act of 1871, which had been largely dormant 
during the twentieth century. The following year in the Picking 
case126 the Third Circuit, taking its cue from the Snowden opin-
121 Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 at 121 (1951). 
122 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1983. 
123 42 u.s.c. (1952) §1985. 
12442 U.S.C. (1952) §§1987 and 1988. 
125 321 U.S. 1 (1944). The cases involving civil liability have interacted with cases 
involving criminal liability. Outstanding cases on criminal liability under the act are 
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951); 
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951). 
126 Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 240. 
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ions, succumbed completely to the literal words of the act, holding 
various officers personally liable, including not only the Governor 
of Pennsylvania but also a justice of the peace. The court sensa-
tionally departed from all previous Anglo-American tradition in 
holding: "If the plaintiffs brought a proper proceeding to secure 
their liberty before Justice of the Peace Keiffer and he refused 
to hear their cause, he may be answerable to the plaintiffs in 
damages."127 A judicial officer may be personally liable for mak-
ing a judicial determination! 
In 1946 Judge Learned Hand was unable to resist the literal 
words of the act, as interpreted in the Snowden and Picking opin-
ions.128 The suit was against various officers of New York City-
the Board of Standards and Appeals, the Department of Housing 
and Building, the Commissioner of Buildings, the Borough Super-
intendent, the chief engineer, and two examiners of the Building 
Department. Despite the clarity of federal law in recognizing the 
immunity of such officers apart from the act, the court said: "What-
ever may have been true before, it seems to us that, since the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Snowden v. Hughes, ... such 
allegations [ deliberate abuse of statutory power] will support an 
action .... "129 The court indicated that it was aware of the ex-
treme consequences of its decision: "So far as we can see, any 
public officer of a state ... will have to defend any action brought 
[ under the act] in which the plaintiff, however irresponsible, is 
willing to make the necessary allegations."130 
Then came many cases rejecting the immunity of judicial, 
administrative, and legislative officers. For instance, the Sixth 
Circuit reversed a dismissal of a complaint in a suit against a justice 
of the peace,131 the Second Circuit reversed a dismissal of a com-
plaint in a suit by a teacher against a school principal alleging 
wrongful discharge,132 and the Ninth Circuit reversed a dismissal 
of a complaint against members of a state legislative investigating 
committee.133 Personal liability of officers of all kinds was growing 
rapidly. 
At this point, the Supreme Court decided to use its power to 
change the direction of law development. In Tenney v. Brand-
121 Id. at 250. 
128 Burt v. City of New York, (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 791. 
120 Id. at 791-792. 
1so Id. at 793. 
131 McShane v. Moldovan, (6th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 1016. 
132 Bomar v. Keyes, (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 136. 
133 Brandhove v. Tenney, (9th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 121, revd. 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
See discussion of the Supreme Court decision immediately below. 
230 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
hove,134 it reversed the holding of the Ninth Circuit that legisla-
tors could be personally liable: "We think it is clear that the 
legislation on which this action is founded does not impose lia-
bility on the facts before us, once they are related to the presup-
positions of our political history. "185 The Court traced the history 
of immunity of legislators, from 1523, through the colonial period, 
to modern times, to show "the tradition of legislative freedom." 
The Court said it would be "a big assumption" to assume that 
Congress has constitutiona~ power to limit the freedom of state 
legislators acting within their traditional sphere. Without dis-
cussing the plain meaning of the statute, the Court declared: "We 
cannot believe that Congress - itself a staunch advocate of legis-
lative freedom-would impinge on a tradition so well grounded 
in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language 
before us."186 As to the allegation of unworthy purpose of the 
legislators, the Court generalized: "Legislators are immune from 
deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, 
not for their private indulgence but for the public good. One 
must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The 
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the 
cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclu-
sion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them 
based upon a jury's speculation as to motives."187 
The opinion in the Tenney case was carefully limited to the 
issue before the Court - the immunity of legislators. But both 
of the major reasons given, the tradition of immunity and the 
need for uninhibited discharge of duty, are fully applicable to 
judicial, executive, and administrative officers. The tradition of 
judicial immunity is probably more deeply embedded than the 
tradition of legislative immunity; the tradition of immunity for 
administrative officers is much less impressive but is nevertheless 
reasonably clear, especially for officers exercising judicial or legis-
lative powers. 
On the basis of the Tenney opinion, the lower courts were 
emboldened to hold that judicial officers were immune from 
liability, despite the clarity of the act's words.188 Even the Third 
184 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
185 Id. at 372. 
186 Id. at 376. 
137 Id. at 377. 
188 Tate v. Arnold, (8th Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 782 (justice of the peace immune); 
Francis v. Crafts, (1st Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 809, cert. den. 346 U.S. 835 (1953); Grubbs 
v. Slater, (W.D. Ky. 1955) 133 F. Supp. 110; United States ex rel. Peters v. Carson, (W.D. 
Pa. 1954) 126 F. Supp. 137; Souther v. Reid, (E.D. Va. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 806; Morgan 
v. Sylvester, (S.D. N.Y. 1954) 125 F. Supp. 380. 
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Circuit, which had denied immunity for a justice of the peace,139 
held that the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
was not liable, although it refrained from determining whether 
its earlier holding was overruled.140 
Immunity of legislators and judges was thus restored; im-
munity of administrative officers was the remaining problem. In 
1953 the First Circuit reversed the dismissal of a complaint by 
school teachers against a mayor and members of a board of alder-
men and common council, alleging that the officers had abrogated 
contract obligations.141 Surprisingly, Judge Magruder said in a 
concurring opinion: "I think that members of a city council would 
be liable in damages for pecuniary harm to a plaintiff intention-
ally inflicted by action, under color of official authority, which 
the defendants subjectively realized would result in depriving the 
plaintiff of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution."142 
Judge Woodbury's dissent was not based upon immunity but upon 
interpretation of the complaint. The First Circuit, however, 
straightened itself out the following year in a masterful opinion 
by Judge Magruder in Francis v. Lyman.143 The opinion in all 
probability embodies the law of the future. The court said that 
"we think it no longer appropriate" to "give effect to the statute 
in its literal wording."144 Instead, the court should "fit the statute 
as harmoniously as may be into the familiar and generally accepted 
legal background, and to confine its application, within reason, to 
those situations which might possibly have had the approval of 
the Congress if it had specifically adverted to the particular cases. 
• • • " 145 The court said that in cases involving discrimination on 
grounds of color and other problems of major concern to the Re-
construction Congress, state officials even act at their peril, and "it 
139 Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 240. 
140 Ginsburg v. Stem, (3d Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 245: "We refrain expressly, however, 
from any determination as to whether the Picking decision has been overruled by the 
Supreme Court ••• by Tenney v. Brandhove." 
141 Cobb v. City of Malden, (1st Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 701. 
142 Id. at 707. Contrast the many cases discussed above in Part IV, in which com• 
plaints were dismissed alleging malice, including, for instance, Gregoire v. Biddle, (2d 
Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579. For application of the principle of the Gregoire case to munic-
ipal officers even further down the scale than members of a city council, see Baker v. 
Mueller, (7th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 180, involving members of a town board, building 
inspector, health inspector, city attorney, and plumbing inspector. 
In a later case, Dunn v. Gazzola, (1st Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 709, Judge Magruder 
wrote the opinion affirming a dismissal of a complaint against a sergeant of police and 
chief of police, alleging conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of equal protection; the ground 
was that the bare conclusionary allegation could not protect the complaint from the 
motion to dismiss. 
143 (1st Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 583. 
144 Id. at 587. 
145 Id. at 587. 
232 MICHIGAN LAw R.Evmw [Vol. 55 
is no defense .. _. that they may have acted, not maliciously, but 
in the good-faith belief that they were performing their official 
duty · under what they thought was valid state legislation. . . . 
But beyond such situations, it seems to be the tendency of the 
decisions to restrict the applications of the Civil Rights Act so as 
to avoid the appalling inflammation of delicate state-federal rela-
tionships which undoubtedly would ensue."146 
The specific holding was nothing more than that superintend-
ents of two institutions, acting pursuant to court order, were not 
liable for false imprisonment.147 The importance of the case lies 
in the broad approach, including a passage quoted from an earlier 
opinion of Judge Magruder, that "the Act merely expresses a prima 
facie liability, leaving to the courts to work out, from ~se to case, 
the defenses by way of official privilege which might be appropriate 
to the particular case."148 
This approach, of course, leads to the judicial reinvention of 
law of official immunity, along the lines of what the courts have 
already invented apart from the Civil Rights Act. 
Under such an approach, members of a city police department 
may be liable, a;, held in the Seventh Circuit.149 A sheriff and 
deputy sheriff may be liable for an illegal search and seizure, as 
held by the Fifth Circuit.160 And a court is likely to have doubt 
and difficulty with the problem of whether a state's attorney should 
be held liable for acquiescence in use of force by lesser officers; 
on this question the Seventh Circuit holds for immunity and the 
Fifth Circuit for liability.101 
Perhaps the law of the future under the Civil Rights Act will 
be the same as the law apart from the act, except where problems 
are involved of the type that were the special concern of the Recon-
struction Congress. 
VII. PERSPECTIVE AND CONCLUSIONS 
What the law of tort liability of public officers and employees 
most needs is an expansion of tort liability of governmental units. 
If the particular governmental unit is liable for the tort, so that 
the loss will thus be properly spread, then the courts will be re-
146 Id. at 588. 
147 The court reasoned that the two superintendents could not be liable for acting 
pursuant to court order, for the legislators who enacted the statute were not liable, and 
the judge who issued the warrant of commitment was not liable. 
148 Cobb v. City of Malden, (1st Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 701 at 706. 
149 Geach v. Moynahan, (7th Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 714. 
150 Davis v. Turner, (5th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 847. 
151 Cawley v. Warren, (7th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 74; Lewis v. Brautigan, (5th Cir. 
1955) 227 F. (2d) 124. 
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lieved from the heed for choosing between leaving a deserving 
plaintiff without remedy and imposing liability upon the in-
dividual officer or employee, who is usually either ill-equipped to 
bear the loss or is performing the type of function that can be 
properly performed only if the officer is free from the need of 
considering his own pocket book. The public interest in fearless 
administration usually should come first, so that officers must be 
immune from liability even when the plaintiff asserts that the 
officers have acted maliciously; when this is so, the only proper 
way to compensate deserving plaintiffs is to impose liability on 
the governmental unit. When the public gets the benefit of a 
program, the public should pay for the torts that may be expected 
in carrying out the program. The only satisfactory solution of 
many problems about liability· of officers and employees is to 
compensate the plaintiff but to hold the officer or employee im-
mune. 
The great body of federal and state law which recognizes the 
central principle that officers exercising discretionary power are 
immune from liability for unintentional torts and even for those 
which are allegedly malicious seems generally satisfactory,152 and 
the scattered state cases that do not recognize this principle prob-
ably should do so. If this principle means that justice is denied 
to deserving plaintiffs, the cure should be to impose liability on 
the governmental unit. The only weakness in this broad conclu-
sion lies in· its application to a case in which the plaintiff can 
'prove that the officer did in fact act maliciously, willfully, or 
corruptly; in such a case, a revulsion to officer immunity is natural 
and sound, except for the harm that may be caused to the many 
conscientious officers by imposing liability on the guilty officer. 
Conceivably, procedural means can be invented (such as affidavits 
and motions for summary judgment) to allow imposition of lia-
bility on the officer in an appropriate case and still protect other 
officers from the necessity of trial to prove absence of malice or 
willfulness; such a solution may be desirable especially when the 
152 This conclusion is drastically in disagreement with the conclusion of Jennings, 
"Tort Liability of Administrative Officers," 21 MINN. L. R.Ev. 263 (1937). Professor Jen-
nings concluded that when officers determine issues with or without hearings or other 
procedural safeguards, the test of their liability should be "whether they acted beyond 
the bounds of reasonable official action" (p. 309), and "whether they had acted in the 
circumstances as reasonable men would have acted." (p. 312) These two tests seem to 
be the same. Both are out of line with the case law, for if the Jennings test were followed, 
officers would often be liable for unintentional torts, and motions to dismiss would have 
to be denied whenever malice is properly alleged. The cases are overwhelming that the 
effective test for liability of officers exercising high discretionary powers is not reasonable-
ness of the officers' determinations, and policy reasons seem strongly to support the cases. 
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functions performed involve a larger proportion •of the ministerial 
and a lesser proportion of the so-called discretionary. Complete 
immunity of officers performing legislative or judicial duties 
should probably be continued-even when malice can be proved. 
The common-law tradition that a servant is liable for his own 
torts committed in the course of employment and that he must 
indemnify the master for any loss resulting from unin~entional 
fault of the servant is contrary to the realities of both corporate 
employment and government employment. The Supreme Court 
has unanimously brought federal law into accord with the realities, 
and other courts may well follow the Supreme Court's lead in 
departing from the common-law tradition. 
The common-law tradition that a servant is liable for his own 
and related torts has been recently reexamined in some thoughtful 
state court opinions, with the result that policemen may be im-
mune from liability when they have acted in good faith. The only 
satisfactory solution of the problem of police abuses is likely to 
be imposition of liability 'upon the governmental unit, thereby 
providing to executive and legislative officers the needed incentive 
for effective discipline of policemen. 
Various state courts have developed confused doctrine in 
trying to distinguish jurisdictional questions from other questions. 
The unfortunate result, following Miller v. Horton,153 is to hold 
officers personally liable for reasonable mistakes even in absence 
of fault. Federal courts from an early time have been quite clear 
that officers should be immune from liability so long as their· 
action is not "manifestly or palpably beyond ... authority."154 
From a practical standpoint, the federal law is superior to the law 
of the state courts that adhere to the doctrine of Miller v. Horton. 
Since 1944, literal interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 has induced many federal courts to impose ·liability upon 
officers in many circumstances in which they would otherwise be 
immune, but beginning with the Supreme Court's 1951 decision 
in Tenney v. Brandhove,155 literal interpretation has declined 
drastically. Officers in the future are likely seldom to be held 
liable under the act unless they would be liable apart from the 
act or unless their action involves subject matter of the kind that 
the Reconstruction Congress may have had specially in mind. 
U3 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891). 
154 Quoted from Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 at 498 (1896). 
llill Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
